

~~T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~

TS#185854-e

C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

2 June 1965

SUBJECT: SNIE 10-6-65: PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO  
CERTAIN US ACTIONS

CHANGE SHEET

Page    Para.    Line

3            3            Suggested CIA new paragraph 3.

3. Hanoi's decisions, however, probably have been and will continue to be influenced by its estimate of the likely course of the war in the South and its doctrinal conviction that it is in a better position than its US and South Vietnamese adversaries to sustain a prolonged and grinding struggle. It probably thinks that, given present VC military strength and the political fragility of the Saigon regime, Communist forces in South Vietnam are moving toward victories which could crack their adversaries' will to continue the struggle. If so, Hanoi might feel that punishment from the air would be an acceptable price to pay for the early achievement of its political objectives, and the vindication of its doctrinal belief in the inevitable success of a "People's War."

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<u>Page</u>	<u>Para.</u>	<u>Line</u>	
7	8	9	Add new sentence to end of paragraph. " Peiping might, however, make threatening troop movements and air deployments in South China with the objective of deterring the US from further bombings."

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Suggested modification of  
Para 4 of 28 May 65 text  
(proposed changes are underlined)  
in

4. Hanoi's decisions, however, have  
probably been and will continue to  
be influenced by its estimate of the  
likely course of the war in the  
South and its doctrinal conviction that  
it is in a better position than ~~the~~ <sup>its</sup> US  
and ~~the~~ <sup>its</sup> South Vietnamese adversaries to  
sustain a prolonged and grinding struggle. ✓

objective) and <sup>the</sup> success ~~but~~ vindication of ~~the~~ Communist

~~theory of~~ its doctrinal belief in the ~~inevitable~~ <sup>inevitable</sup>  
success of a "People's War".

Shem, on their determination -  
 the DRV will be inclined  
 to opt for negotiations &  
 the political track RF  
 (both in my opinion only if)  
two conditions prevail

(1) They are taking a serious  
 pounding in the north

and

(2) They are checked on the  
 ground in the south

So that they find themselves faced  
 with an indefatigable mil. struggle  
 in SVN during which the territory  
 of NVN is going to be systematically  
 worked over.

So long as they see their (i.e., the VC's)  
 position in the south steadily improving  
 -- particularly if ~~view~~ they see the Sany  
 regime fragile & they read the NY Times, Walter  
 Lippman, news of tech. ins etc -- they will  
 hang on almost no matter what we do  
 in the ~~South~~ North